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h i g h l i g h t s
• We study a specific multi-winner contest mechanism.
• Here losers are sequentially eliminated to choose the winners.
• It is contrary to Clark and Riis (1996) who select the winners sequentially.
• It becomes equivalent to Berry (1993) who selects the winners simultaneously.
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a b s t r a c t
We consider a multi-winner nested elimination contest in which losers are sequentially eliminated
to attain the set of winners. This is a variant of a widely used mechanism introduced by Clark and
Riis (1996) that allows one to select the winners sequentially. We show that the current mechanism
becomes equivalent to the mechanism suggested by Berry (1993) in which the winners are chosen
simultaneously.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
In many contests, in which players expend costly resources in
order to win a prize, there are multiple winners. Examples include
multiple medals in sports, early bird prizes, set of winners in
rent-seeking, set of recipients of research grants—to name a few.
In the literature these contests are interchangeably called multi-
winner contests (Berry, 1993) ormulti-prize contests (Sisak, 2009).
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0/).We define multi-winner contests as contests in which there are
more than one prize, but each player may win at most one of
them. Most of the examples mentioned above are covered by this
definition.
In this note we consider a particular multi-winner contest
mechanism widely applied in the field in which losers are
sequentially eliminated to reach the final set of winners. We show
that it is a variant of a highly cited mechanism introduced by Clark
and Riis (1996), and is equivalent to another famous mechanism
introduced by Berry (1993).
Berry (1993) was the first to analyze multi-winner contests
using the framework of rent-seeking (Tullock, 1980). He considers
a contest amongN playerswith k(< N) prizes. He assumes that the
probability of a player to win a prize is the sum of efforts expended
by any combination of a k-player group that includes the specified
player, divided by any combination of a k-player group. Hence, the
probability that player iwins a prize is:
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where x is the vector of the efforts, and xi is the effort of player i.
Clark and Riis (1996) show that this winner selection mecha-
nism inadvertently allows one prize to be allocated according to
the effort outlays, while the others are allocated independent of
the effort outlays. Since it is possible to win prize in combina-
tion with other players’ efforts, this, in turn, results in free-riding
among players.
They further introduce a nestedmechanism inwinner selection.
According to this mechanism, players expend effort, then one
player is selected as winner using a Tullock (1980) contest
success function. Then that player and his efforts are taken out
of the calculation and another Tullock contest is run among the
remaining (N−1) players using their already expended effort, and
another winner is taken out. This procedure is repeated for k times
to select kwinners. Here, the probability that player iwins a prize
becomes:
PCRi (x) = p1i +
k−1
j=1

j
s=1
(1− psi )pj+1i

where psi is the probability of player i to win the prize at period s.
The issues of allocation of prizes being independent of the effort
outlays, and free-riding, do not arise under this mechanism.
Both of the mechanisms are widely cited by researchers
investigating issues in multi-winner contests (see Sisak, 2009
for a survey). However, as Clark and Riis (1996) mention, when
one allows ‘‘the imperfectly discriminating rent-seeking contest to
have several winners, there is no unique method for selecting those
winners’’. There are other mechanisms that are employed in the
field in addition to the two mechanisms introduced above.
One of the popular mechanisms employed in the field is very
similar to the one introduced in the Clark and Riis (1996) study.
However, instead of selecting-in winners in each nested period,
the mechanism selects-out losers. This is common in elimination
contests in which the losers are gradually selected out. This
includes elimination of losers in sit-and-draw contests (in which
contestants draw pictures and the examiners decide upon the
winners by eliminating the not-so-good drawings), elimination of
job candidates to reach the final set (in which job candidates’ CVs
are used to eliminate the candidates who do not have a chance),
promotional tournaments (where contestants are gradually taken
out), etc.
Here we consider a mechanism similar to Clark and Riis (1996)
to eliminate (N − k) possible losers in (N − k) elimination periods
and show that it turns out to be equivalent to the mechanism
suggested by Berry (1993). We then discuss the implications and
possible extensions regarding those mechanisms.
2. Model
Consider a contest among N(> 2) players with k (1 < k < N)
prizes. The players exert effort only once, but the winner selection
(or loser elimination) process is of multi periods through which
N − k among the N players are eliminated. In each period, one
player is eliminated, and when k players are left, the identical
prizes (with individual valuation V ) are granted to the survivors. Alottery (Tullock, 1980) type contest success function is employed
to eliminate losers in every period.
To define the probability of winning a prize, first let It be the
set of survivors at period t(≥1). Also denote the effort level of jth
player in It by xtj .
2 Since one and only one player is dropped out in
each period, the number of elements in set It is
|It | = N − t + 1,
and the aggregate effort at period t is
X t(It) =
N−t+1
j=1
xtj .
Then, conditional on player i having survived the previous periods,
the probability that he is eliminated in period t is
qti (It) =
X t − xi
X t − xt1
+ X t − xt2+ · · · + X t − xtN−t+1
= X
t − xi
(N − t)X t .
As one can easily notice, this probability can be described as a
Tullock-type contest failure function. Its complementary probabil-
ity, 1 − qti , is the probability of winning a prize in Berry’s contest
where the number of players isN− t+1 and that of prizes isN− t .
Next, we define the sequence of losers sl as
sl =

n1l , n
2
l , . . . , n
N−k
l

where ntl is the player eliminated in period t according to the
schedule of sl. Since sl has the same information that sequence
{It}N−kt=1 has, we can define the probability of ntl being eliminated
in period t as
pt(sl) = qtntl (It)
provided that sl and It are consistent; i.e., none of

n1l , n
2
l , . . . , n
t−1
l

is in It , but ntl ∈ It .
Then, the probability that player i wins a prize is defined as
follows:
Pi(x) =

sl∈Si

N−k
t=1
pt(sl)

where x is the vector of the efforts, and Si is the set of all sequences
(of length N − k) that do not have i in its slots.
Although a complete derivation of the probability of winning is
beyond the scope of this note, we concentrate on the interesting
case that is the usual focus in the literature. Since the valuations
are symmetric, we restrict our analysis to the symmetric case. Let
us assume that player i exerts xi and all the others x−i. Then, for any
sl ∈ Si,
pt(sl) =
X t − xntl
(N − t)X t
= (N − t − 1)x−i + xi
(N − t) [(N − t)x−i + xi] ,
and
N−k
t=1
pt(sl) = (N − 2)x−i + xi
(N − 1) [(N − 1)x−i + xi]
× (N − 3)x−i + xi
(N − 2) [(N − 2)x−i + xi] · · ·
(k− 1) x−i + xi
k [kx−i + xi]
= (k− 1) x−i + xi
(N − 1)(N − 2) · · · k [(N − 1)x−i + xi] .
2 Note that the effort is expended only once at the start of the contest. Due to
the elimination of players in each period, denoting the effort for each period (xtj )
separately, however, allows ease of notation.
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|Si| = (N − 1)!
(k− 1)!
which is the number of cases to choose N − k losers among N − 1
players (player i is already chosen as a winner), we can write the
probability of player iwinning a prize as
Pi(x) = (N − 1)!
(k− 1)! ×
(k− 1) x−i + xi
(N − 1)(N − 2) · · · k [(N − 1)x−i + xi]
= (k− 1) x−i + xi
(N − 1)x−i + xi .
This contest success function is identicalwith the one suggested
by Berry (1993) (please see the Appendix). Hence, the equilibrium
effort and the corresponding comparative statics are also the same
as the ones in Berry (1993).
3. Discussion
We consider a multi-winner nested elimination contest in
which losers are sequentially eliminated to attain the set of
winners. Thismechanism incorporates an array of real life contests
and is similar to the one by Clark and Riis (1996), who consider
sequential acceptance of winners. We show that theoretically
this mechanism is equivalent to the simultaneous selection
mechanism of Berry (1993). Since the theoretical results predict
different rent-dissipation among winner selection mechanisms,
the equivalence result allows contest designers to implement the
appropriate mechanism in accordance with their objectives and
applicability.
A couple of issues relating to this mechanism are worth noting.
First, although this mechanism is implemented in various real
life situations, one can note that the issues of allocating prizes
independent of the effort outlays and the resulting free-riding by
players, as in Berry (1993), will be observed under this mechanism
aswell. Second, by construction the equivalence proof only applies
to symmetric equilibria, and it leaves open the possibility thatwith
asymmetric players or heterogeneous prizes, the equivalence does
not hold. It may be possible in the future for one to introduce
risk aversion, player asymmetry, and prize asymmetry within this
structure and derive a general relationship among the contest
mechanisms.It is also possible to introduce other popularly employedmech-
anisms and compare them with the existing ones. Another inter-
esting extension would be to study endogenous entry into this
contest in comparison with other contests such as Clark and Riis
(1996). Finally, the existing results provide clear ranking of rent-
dissipation among multi-winner mechanisms, but it would be in-
teresting to investigate whether the theoretical benchmark results
still hold behaviorally. Very little experimental research had been
carried out in the area of multi-winner contests (see Dechenaux
et al., 2012 for a comprehensive survey), and one obvious first at-
tempt can be to test and compare these three mechanisms in the
laboratory.
Appendix
Clark and Riis (1996) show that the contest success function of
Berry (1993) can be rewritten as
PBi (x) =
xi
X
+

1− xi
X
 k− 1
N − 1
= (k− 1)X + (N − k)xi
(N − 1)X
where X is the sum of all efforts. When player i exerts xi and all the
others x−i, the probability becomes
PBi (x) =
(k− 1) [(N − 1) x−i + xi]+ (N − k)xi
(N − 1) [(N − 1) x−i + xi]
= (k− 1) x−i + xi
(N − 1)x−i + xi
which is identical with the probability of winning a prize in the
sequential-elimination contest.
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